4 edition of Foreign entry and bank competition found in the catalog.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 7/27/2006.Includes bibliographical references.Also available in print.System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.Mode of access: World Wide Web.
|Statement||Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis|
|Publishers||Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||xvi, 67 p. :|
|Number of Pages||46|
|2||Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis : Online) -- 2006-043A.|
|3||Working paper -- 2006-043A|
Foreign entry and bank competition are modeled as the interaction between asymmetrically informed principals: the entrant uses collateral as a screening device to contest the incumbents informational advantage.Both better information ex ante and stronger legal protection ex post are shown to facilitate the entry of low-cost outside competitors into credit markets.The entrants success in gaining borrowers of higher quality by offering cheaper loans increases with its efficiency (cost) advantage.This paper accounts for evidence suggesting that foreign banks tend to lend more to large firms thereby neglecting small and medium enterprises.The results also explain why this observed bias is stronger in emerging markets--Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis web site. File Size: 2MB.
2011 and Bessler and Kurmann 2014 explained the mixed results, stating that the increased foreign bank presence is related with either a low or high risk factor, which ultimately influences the financial stability across the banking sector. Pacific Basin Finance Journal 48: 144—61. Bonn, Germany: University of Bonn. Another destabilizing impact from declining loans results from the spill-over into the non-financial sector.
" ," 210, Sveriges Riksbank Central Bank of Sweden. The dependent variable is the log of ZSC for all models. Since the majority of foreign banks in Africa are originated from developed countries, our result suggests to governments to encourage and diversify foreign bank presence in the continent.
2013 Bank Concentration BC5 This is the large five banks ratio in terms of total assets to the total assets Foreign entry and bank competition the banking industry. htm accessed on 13 May 2019. We used different indicators to measure the risk-taking behavior Z-score and non-performing loans to gross loans NPG ratio and also the role of bank competition measured by H-statistics, which is a nonstructural element derived from the model Bikker et al. 2019, 12, 106 9 of 26 we employed pooled regression models and dynamic panel models using the 2SLS approach with robust standard errors.
2012; Karolyi and Taboada 2015. The Z-score is an inverse indicator for such overall risk. In addition, the information asymmetry among investors, banks, and financiers will influence the choice of investors, thereby affecting the competition.
43 6pages 1250-1276, November. The positive effects of foreign investment include human resource development through improved higher education Baskaran and Muchie 2008; East Asian Bureau of Economic Research, and China Center for International Economic Exchanges 2016higher remunerations in the industry Vijaya and Kaltani 2015and stronger corporate governance practices accruing to better performance and financial stability Spong and Sullivan 2007; Kim et al.
61 5pages 2511-2546, October. 76 2pages 237-269, May.
We used cross-country data for the banking sector from 2000 to 2016. The study indicates that foreign banks' future investment in the branches and their fairer way of competing will force the local Chinese banks to gather and reveal their private information, enhancing their transparency. 26 Cpages 4-24. This allows to link your profile to this item.
[CrossRef] Lensink, Robert, and Niels Hermes.
The significant value of the Wald test explains that the models are correctly specified, the Wu—Hausman test shows the endogeneity, the insignificant values of the Sargan test confirm the over-identifying restrictions, and the robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The GMM results show that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between foreign bank entry and bank competition.